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RADIUS with 802.1X

How RADIUS works

Work Wi-Fi with your own username

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L7ApplicationPort 1812UDP
What brings you here?

Watch it happen

How much detail

Joining work Wi-Fi with a username and password: 802.1X, EAP-PEAP inside RADIUS, then the 4-way handshake.

Arjun's laptop
Office Wi-Fi
Office switch
RADIUS server
Wi-FiCableSetupRequestResponseEncrypted

6 steps, 20 packets

First up: Join the network. Press Play to watch it happen, one step at a time.

0 of 60/6

What is RADIUS?

At home everyone shares one Wi-Fi password. At work, each person logs in with their own account. That is 802.1X: the access point keeps your connection closed and passes your login, using EAP, to a central RADIUS server that says yes or no.

RADIUS also logs who connected and when, can put each user on the right network (staff, guests, devices) and lets IT remove one person's access without changing a password for everyone. VPNs and network switches use it in the same way.

Think of it like this. 802.1X with RADIUS is like a hotel lobby with a guard at each door. The guard (the access point) does not know the guests. He passes your sealed card to the front desk (RADIUS) on the phone, and only opens the door when the desk says this guest may enter, and to which floor.

Step by step

Normal

6 steps

Joining work Wi-Fi with a username and password: 802.1X, EAP-PEAP inside RADIUS, then the 4-way handshake.

  1. 1

    Join the network

    Radio link, port closed

    The laptop associates with the Office Wi-Fi. The access point (the authenticator) lets only 802.1X frames through until the login succeeds.

  2. 2

    Who are you?

    EAP identity, sent to RADIUS

    The laptop (the supplicant) gives an outer identity. The access point puts each EAP message inside a RADIUS Access-Request and sends it to the RADIUS server (the authentication server).

  3. 3

    Build a TLS tunnel

    PEAP: the server shows its certificate

    Over several Access-Challenge round trips, the laptop and the RADIUS server run a TLS handshake inside EAP. The laptop checks the server's certificate, so it knows it is talking to the real company server before saying anything secret.

  4. 4

    Inner login

    MSCHAPv2 inside the tunnel

    Inside the encrypted tunnel, the laptop proves the real username and password with MSCHAPv2. The access point only sees encrypted bytes.

  5. 5

    Access-Accept

    Keys and a VLAN

    The server says Access-Accept, includes EAP-Success, and sends the access point the key material for this laptop, encrypted with the shared secret. It may also pick a VLAN for the user.

  6. 6

    4-way handshake

    Fresh Wi-Fi keys, port open

    The access point and laptop run the WPA 4-way handshake from that key. Now the port opens, the laptop asks DHCP for an address and traffic flows encrypted over the air.

Wrong password

4 steps

The password is mistyped: the inner check fails and RADIUS sends Access-Reject.

  1. 1

    Join the network

    Radio link, port closed

    Association happens as normal. Only 802.1X frames may pass.

  2. 2

    Who are you?

    Same identity exchange

    EAPOL-Start, the anonymous outer identity and the first Access-Request happen as normal.

  3. 3

    Inner check fails

    MSCHAPv2 error 691

    The server certificate checks out and the TLS tunnel is built. Inside it, the server finds that the password proof is wrong and reports MSCHAPv2 failure code 691.

  4. 4

    Access-Reject

    The port stays closed

    The server sends Access-Reject with EAP-Failure. The access point passes EAP-Failure to the laptop and keeps the port closed. No address, no network. Repeated failures can lock the account for a while, which slows guessing.

Fake access point

3 steps

A stranger sets up a Wi-Fi with the same name, but the laptop refuses its certificate.

  1. 1

    Same name, stronger signal

    The laptop tries the fake one

    Wi-Fi names are not proof of anything. A stranger in the car park broadcasts Office too, and the laptop tries it.

  2. 2

    Wrong certificate

    Not signed by the company CA

    The fake runs its own login server, but it cannot have a certificate for radius.example.com signed by the company's CA. The laptop is set to trust only that CA and that name.

  3. 3

    Laptop stops

    TLS alert, no password sent

    The laptop sends a TLS alert and gives up before the inner login, so the fake never gets the password proof. Devices that are set to accept any certificate are the ones that leak, which is why the certificate check must be on.

Myths and mix-ups

  • The access point does not check your password; it only carries EAP to the RADIUS server.
  • RADIUS itself does not encrypt your password in PEAP; the TLS tunnel inside EAP does.
  • A Wi-Fi name proves nothing; only the server certificate check stops a fake access point.
  • 802.1X is not only for Wi-Fi; wired switch ports use it too.

Try it yourself

Run these on your own computer to see RADIUS at work.

  • Login state on Linux

    wpa_cli status

    Look for Supplicant PAE state=AUTHENTICATED and EAP state=SUCCESS.

  • Wi-Fi details on Windows

    netsh wlan show interfaces

    Authentication shows WPA2-Enterprise or WPA3-Enterprise on an 802.1X network.

  • Test your own RADIUS server

    radtest testuser testpass 127.0.0.1 0 testing123

    On a lab RADIUS server you run yourself. Access-Accept or Access-Reject comes back.

RADIUS at a glance

Layer
Application (7); EAPOL is layer 2
Ports
UDP 1812 (login), 1813 (accounting)
Transport
UDP (RADIUS over TLS uses TCP 2083)
Roles
Supplicant, authenticator, authentication server
Common EAP methods
PEAP, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS
Codes
Access-Request, Challenge, Accept, Reject
Protected by
A shared secret between AP and server

Defined inRFC 2865 (RADIUS)RFC 2866 (accounting)RFC 3579 (RADIUS and EAP)RFC 3748 (EAP)IEEE 802.1XRFC 6614 (RADIUS over TLS)

Header fields

What RADIUS puts in its messages, with example values from the stories above.

RADIUS

Code
1 (Access-Request)
Identifier
21Matches each answer to its request.
Authenticator
16 bytesA random value. The reply's authenticator is made from it and the shared secret, so fake replies are spotted.
User-Name
anonymous@example.comThe outer name is a placeholder. The real username only travels inside the encrypted tunnel.
NAS-IP-Address
10.0.10.2
Called-Station-Id
A4-91-B1-00-10-02:OfficeWhich access point and network name the user is joining.
Calling-Station-Id
3C-22-FB-4D-5E-6FThe laptop's MAC address.
NAS-Port-Type
Wireless-802.11 (19)
EAP-Message
Response, IdentityThe access point does not understand the login itself. It only carries EAP back and forth.
Message-Authenticator
HMAC-MD5, 16 bytesSigns the whole packet with the shared secret. Servers should demand it on every packet.

Test yourself

Question 1 of 5Score 0

In 802.1X, which device is the authenticator?

Questions people ask

What is the difference between WPA2-Personal and WPA2-Enterprise?

Personal uses one shared password for everyone. Enterprise uses 802.1X: each person logs in with their own account, checked by a RADIUS server.

What port does RADIUS use?

UDP 1812 for authentication and UDP 1813 for accounting. RADIUS over TLS uses TCP 2083.

Is RADIUS secure?

Classic RADIUS over UDP relies on an MD5-based shared secret. After the 2024 Blast-RADIUS flaw, servers should require Message-Authenticator on every packet, and RADIUS over TLS is preferred across untrusted networks. The login itself is protected by EAP methods like PEAP or EAP-TLS.

What is EAP-TLS and why is it safer than PEAP?

EAP-TLS uses a certificate on each device instead of a password, so there is nothing to type, guess or phish. PEAP with a password is easier to roll out.

Why does my laptop ask me to trust a certificate when joining work Wi-Fi?

That is the RADIUS server's certificate. Only accept it if your IT team confirms the name and issuer, because this check is what protects you from fake access points.

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