What is DNSSEC?
DNSSEC adds digital signatures to DNS records. A resolver that checks them can tell whether an answer really came from the domain's owner and was not changed on the way. A forged or broken answer is thrown away.
Trust runs in a chain. The root zone's key is built into resolvers. The root signs a fingerprint of each top-level domain's key, those sign a fingerprint of each domain's key, and each domain signs its own records. DNSSEC proves answers are genuine, but it does not hide them.
Think of it like this. It is like a sealed letter with a wax stamp. Anyone can read the letter, but a stranger cannot change it without breaking the seal. You know the stamp is real because a trusted office keeps a copy of it, and that office's own stamp is known to everyone.
Step by step
Chain checked
5 stepsA validating resolver follows signatures from the root key down to www.example.com and marks the answer as verified.
Chain checked
5 stepsA validating resolver follows signatures from the root key down to www.example.com and marks the answer as verified.
- 1
Ask with DO bit
Send signatures, please
The resolver asks each server with the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit set, so every answer comes with RRSIG records: digital signatures over the data.
- 2
Root vouches for .com
DS record, signed by the root
The root's referral includes a DS record for .com: a fingerprint of the .com key. It is signed with the root key, which the resolver already trusts because it is built in.
- 3
.com vouches for example.com
Fetch the .com key, check the DS
The resolver fetches the .com DNSKEY set and checks it matches the fingerprint the root gave. The .com referral then carries a signed DS for example.com.
- 4
Signed answer
A record plus RRSIG
example.com's name server returns the address with its signature. The resolver fetches example.com's DNSKEY, checks it against the DS from .com, then checks the signature on the address.
- 5
AD flag
Every link holds
Root key signs the .com fingerprint, .com key signs the example.com fingerprint, example.com key signs the address. The resolver sets AD (Authenticated Data) on the answer to your laptop.
Forged answer
4 stepsA box on the path swaps the address for its own. The signature no longer matches, so the resolver refuses to answer.
Forged answer
4 stepsA box on the path swaps the address for its own. The signature no longer matches, so the resolver refuses to answer.
- 1
Normal question
Keys already cached
The resolver already trusts the .com key and the DS for example.com from an earlier lookup. It asks example.com's name server for www.example.com.
- 2
Answer is changed
203.0.113.10 becomes 192.0.2.66
A tampering box on the path rewrites the answer to point at its own fake site. It cannot make a new signature, because it does not have example.com's private key.
- 3
Signature fails
Math does not match
The resolver checks the RRSIG with example.com's public key. The signed data says 203.0.113.10, the answer says 192.0.2.66, so the check fails and the answer is marked bogus.
- 4
SERVFAIL
No answer beats a wrong answer
The resolver returns SERVFAIL to your laptop, often with Extended DNS Error 6, DNSSEC Bogus. The page does not load, but you are never sent to the fake site.
Signature expired
3 stepsThe domain owner's signing job stopped, the signatures ran past their end date, and the whole domain goes dark for validating resolvers.
Signature expired
3 stepsThe domain owner's signing job stopped, the signatures ran past their end date, and the whole domain goes dark for validating resolvers.
- 1
Normal question
Nothing looks wrong
Lucas asks for www.example.com. The name server is up and answers right away.
- 2
Old signature
Valid until yesterday
Every RRSIG has an end date. Zones must be re-signed before that date, usually by an automatic job. Here the job stopped a week ago.
- 3
SERVFAIL for everyone
Extended DNS Error 7
A validating resolver treats an expired signature like a broken one and answers SERVFAIL. Users of non-validating resolvers still reach the site, which makes this outage confusing to track down.
Myths and mix-ups
- DNSSEC does not encrypt anything; it signs answers so changes can be spotted. For privacy, use DNS over HTTPS.
- DNSSEC does not protect the last hop to your laptop on its own; your device trusts the resolver's AD flag unless it validates itself.
- A SERVFAIL from DNSSEC is not a server crash; it is the resolver refusing an answer it could not verify.
- Signing a zone once is not enough: signatures expire and must be renewed, usually every few days or weeks.
Try it yourself
Run these on your own computer to see DNSSEC at work.
Ask for signatures
dig +dnssec www.example.comLook for RRSIG records and the ad flag in the flags line. ad means your resolver validated it.
See a domain's keys
dig +multiline example.com DNSKEYShows the key signing key (257) and zone signing key (256) with their key tags.
See the fingerprint in the parent
dig example.com DSThe DS record lives in .com and links the two zones together.
Skip validation to compare
dig +cd www.example.comcd means checking disabled. If this works but a normal query gives SERVFAIL, DNSSEC is failing.
Follow the chain
delv www.example.comShips with BIND tools. Prints fully validated when every signature checks out.
DNSSEC at a glance
- Layer
- Application (7), inside DNS
- Port
- 53, same as DNS
- New records
- DNSKEY, RRSIG, DS, NSEC, NSEC3
- Signal bits
- DO in the query, AD in the answer
- Common algorithm
- 13 (ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256)
- Root signed
- July 2010
- Defined
- 2005 (RFC 4033, 4034, 4035)
Defined inRFC 4033RFC 4034RFC 4035
Header fields
What DNSSEC puts in its messages, with example values from the stories above.
DNS
- Transaction ID
0x5b10- Flags
0x81a0 Standard query response, recursion available, authenticated, No errorAD=1: the resolver verified every signature from the root down. Your laptop trusts the resolver for this.- Query
www.example.com, type A, class IN- OPT (EDNS0)
UDP payload 1232, DO bit setDO means DNSSEC OK: send me the signatures too. 1232 bytes keeps the reply in one unfragmented packet.- Authority
com DS, SHA-256 digest of the .com keyDS is a fingerprint of the .com key, kept in the parent zone. The parent vouches for the child.- Answer
com DNSKEY 257 (key signing key)Flag 257 marks the key signing key. Its hash must equal the DS the root published.- Extended DNS Error
6 (DNSSEC Bogus)Tells tools why it failed: the signatures did not validate.
Test yourself
What does DNSSEC add to DNS?
Questions people ask
What is DNSSEC in simple terms?
It adds signatures to DNS answers so a resolver can check that they came from the real domain owner and were not changed on the way.
Does DNSSEC encrypt DNS?
No. Everyone can still read DNSSEC answers. It only proves they are genuine. DNS over HTTPS or DNS over TLS handle privacy.
How do I check if a domain has DNSSEC?
Run dig example.com DS. If a DS record comes back, the parent zone vouches for the domain's key. Then dig +dnssec shows the signatures.
Why does DNSSEC cause SERVFAIL?
A validating resolver could not verify the answer: a signature expired, a key changed without updating the DS, or the answer was tampered with.
Should I turn on DNSSEC for my domain?
Yes, if your DNS provider signs automatically and renews signatures for you. Then add the DS record they give you at your registrar.